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Although executive control and automatic behavior have often been considered separate
and distinct processes, there is strong emerging and convergent evidence that they may
in fact be intricately interlinked. In this review, we draw together evidence showing that
visual stimuli cause automatic and unconscious motor activation, and how this in turn has
implications for executive control. We discuss object affordances, alien limb syndrome, the
visual grasp reflex, subliminal priming, and subliminal triggering of attentional orienting.
Consideration of these findings suggests automatic motor activation might form an
intrinsic part of all behavior, rather than being categorically different from voluntary actions.
Keywords: action, cognitive control, response inhibition, unconscious, volition
It is widely believed that human cognition and behavior is gov-
erned by both voluntary and automatic processes. Voluntary
“executive control” mechanisms are assumed to direct behavior in
goal-directed ways through use of explicit knowledge and expec-
tations. On the other hand, accumulating research has revealed
that perceptual processing of visual stimuli can automatically
and unconsciously modulate motor responses (see e.g., Eimer
and Schlaghecken, 2003; Sumner, 2007). Traditionally, the pro-
cesses underpinning automatic and unconscious triggering of
actions have been considered separate from the processes under-
pinning voluntary action planning and control. Embedded in this
concept of separate functional pathways is the idea that auto-
matic processes are unconscious, fast, and rigid whereas voluntary
action planning and control were considered to be conscious,
and flexible (see e.g., Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin and
Schneider, 1977, 1984). However, several lines of evidence, briefly
reviewed previously by Sumner and Husain (2008), challenge this
traditional distinction.
In this review we consider recent empirical findings and dis-
cuss how they provide evidence that voluntary and automatic
control of action might not in fact be so distinct. We suggest that
many “automatic” mechanisms can in fact be surprisingly flexi-
ble, quite unlike the traditional, inflexible view of these processes.
We begin by reviewing evidence that even simple, flashed visual
stimuli can automatically modulate on-going motor responses.
Then we discuss how automatically primed responses might affect
interactions with real objects in the world around us, focusing on
the subject of object affordance. Finally we turn to the issue of
how such primed activity might be controlled, and to what extent
such control could be automatic. Throughout the review, we draw
on evidence from three converging approaches: using subliminal
priming paradigms to show that unconscious motor activation
can also be reversed unconsciously; using traditional “conscious
inhibition” paradigms to show that such inhibition can also be
triggered automatically; using the two types of paradigm together
to see if they interact. The demonstration of flexible control
over automatic processes suggests an intricate link between these
historically distinct processes.
EVIDENCE FOR AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION OF MOTOR
RESPONSES
Perceptual processing of a visual stimulus can result in motor
responses even when the observer does not intend to act. One
of the most well-studied of these phenomena is the “visual grasp
reflex”, where an observer makes a fast, reflexive eye movement
(saccade) toward a suddenly appearing—and irrelevant—visual
stimulus, despite their intention to look elsewhere (e.g., Theeuwes
et al., 1998; Irwin et al., 2000). Even when irrelevant distractors do
not fully succeed in capturing gaze they may nevertheless have a
remarkable influence on on-going motor activity. For example,
saccades can curve whilst in flight toward an irrelevant distrac-
tor on the way to correctly landing on the target (e.g., McPeek
and Keller, 2001; Godijn and Theeuwes, 2002; McPeek et al., 2000,
2003). But as response latencies increase, saccades are more likely
to curve away from a distractor (e.g., Walker et al., 2006), reveal-
ing an inhibitory mechanism acting to suppress unwanted motor
activity toward the irrelevant stimulus (e.g., Sheliga et al., 1995).
Saccades toward targets can also be slowed when an
irrelevant distractor is presented simultaneously—or nearly
simultaneously—with the target (the saccade distractor effect;
e.g., Walker et al., 1995, 2000). Furthermore, transient changes
to the scene during saccade planning in simple tasks, reading,
or visual search produce a characteristic “dip” in the frequency
of saccades made around 90–100ms after the change (saccadic
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inhibition effect; e.g., Reingold and Stampe, 1999, 2000, 2002,
2003; Buonocore and McIntosh, 2008; Edelman and Xu, 2009;
Bompas and Sumner, 2011). These dips provide highly robust
evidence for rapid modulation of on-going motor commands by
visual information. Manual reaching responses too are affected by
irrelevant non-target stimuli. Like saccades, reaches can be slowed
(e.g., Tipper et al., 1997), curve toward (e.g., Tipper et al., 1997)
or away from (e.g., Howard and Tipper, 1997) non-target stimuli
in flight. These findings suggest that both manual and oculomo-
tor responses can be automatically modulated by irrelevant visual
inputs.
Although not often considered in this context, such effects of
irrelevant stimuli might in fact be related to a long-established
view that simply visually processing an object can automatically
evoke action plans appropriate for interacting with it. Gibson
(1979) described “affordances” as properties of the environment
that automatically prime the observer to act in such a way.
According to this view, seeing a coffee cup with its handle to the
right affords—or facilitates—a reaching movement with the right
hand to grasp the cup. Recently there has been renewed inter-
est in affordances, and their effects have been examined using
functional imaging as well as behavioral methods. For exam-
ple, motor regions of the brain—such as those within the dorsal
medial frontal cortex—are activated when observers merely look
at a graspable object (e.g., Grèzes and Decety, 2002), even when
they do not intend to act. In other tasks that require arbitrary
responses to pictures of graspable objects (such as squeezing a
trigger to indicate whether the object is man-made), the response
is facilitated when it is congruent with the action afforded by
the object (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 1998; see Figures 1A and B
for examples of typical affordance stimuli and their effects on
response times). Findings such as these suggest that the brain
has learnt to associate objects with actions appropriate to “cap-
ture” them, and these actions can be (partially) activated by visual
processing of the object.
However, there has been some debate about whether object
affordance effects genuinely arise from visual objects automati-
cally eliciting motor plans. Anderson et al. (2002) observed that
the most visually salient part of the objects used in many affor-
dance studies were also often the graspable part of the object.
They demonstrated that response times were faster whenever the
side of the response corresponded with whichever side of the
object was most visually salient, even when the object was not
graspable (e.g., left hand responses to a picture of an analog clock
showing a time of quarter to nine). Therefore, affordance-like
behavioral effects do not necessarily arise from possibilities for
action per se, but instead can stem from congruence between the
required response and this shift of attention.
But this is not to say all affordance effects are perceptual.
Object orientation was irrelevant in most other affordance exper-
iments (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 1998), but by contrast it was the
response-defining property of the object in Anderson and col-
leagues’ task. They also used line-drawings of common objects
which may have evoked qualitatively different responses than
those evoked by the photographs or images of 3D models
used elsewhere (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 1998; Phillips and Ward,
2002; McBride et al., 2012). Furthermore, perceptually lateralized
stimuli that do not afford actions do not necessarily produce
affordance effects (e.g., Buccino et al., 2009). Finally, object affor-
dance effects have recently been shown with stimuli and responses
that are not lateralized, and instead rely on compatibility between
object size and response (pinch or power grasp) to produce affor-
dance effects (e.g., Ellis and Tucker, 2000; Tucker and Ellis, 2001;
Derbyshire et al., 2006; Ellis et al., 2007). These considerations
suggest that there are good reasons to believe perceptual process-
ing of graspable objects can automatically evoke motor responses
associated with them.
ALIEN HAND SYNDROME AND UTILIZATION BEHAVIOR
Some of the most striking evidence that visual objects can
indeed automatically generate responses comes from studies
of some unusual neurological cases. Patients with alien hand
syndrome spontaneously and involuntarily grasp objects—even
other people—in their environment as if magnetically drawn to
them (for a review see Scepkowski and Cronin-Golumb, 2003).
These individuals are aware of their hand making these move-
ments, but report that they are not controlling them, and instead
feel the movements are being controlled by an external agent. In a
related syndrome, patients who display utilization behavior auto-
matically grasp and use objects placed within their reach, even
when the objects are not needed. For example, they may grasp
and begin to peel an apple placed within their reach, even though
they are not hungry, do not want to eat the apple, and know that
it doesn’t belong to them (e.g., Boccardi et al., 2002).
Alien limb and utilization behavior are rare neurological syn-
dromes, and so case reports and experimental studies on patients
with them have been correspondingly few. Some of the most
detailed investigation comes from Riddoch and her colleagues
(Riddoch et al., 1998; Humphreys and Riddoch, 2000). They
showed that patients with an alien right hand can correctly pick
up a cup with the left hand as long as the cup’s handle is also on
the left. However, when the handle is on the right the patients
are more likely to grasp the cup with the right hand, despite
instructions to the contrary. These “interference” errors were
reduced when the task was to point to the object, rather than
grasp, and alsowhen the objects were inverted. Therefore, it seems
that these patients responded according to well-learnt affordance-
action associations rather than according to the instructions they
were given. The action afforded by the object was disrupted
when the object was inverted, or when the action required was
not the one usually made to the object (pointing instead of
grasping), so fewer interference errors were reported under these
conditions.
Alien limb and utilization syndromes are most often associ-
ated with focal lesions to the medial frontal lobes (particularly the
supplementary motor area; SMA e.g., Lhermitte, 1983; Boccardi
et al., 2002), but have also been associated with damage to the cor-
pus callosum (e.g., Biran and Chatterjee, 2004), as well as patients
with parietal lesions following posterior cerebral artery stroke
(e.g., Coulthard et al., 2007; Bartolo et al., 2011). Increasingly,
they are recognized in patients with corticobasal degeneration
(CBD), a slowly progressive neurodegenerative condition which
affects cortical regions as well as the basal ganglia (e.g., Murray
et al., 2007; Tiwari and Amar, 2008).
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FIGURE 1 | McBride et al. (2012) studied automatic priming of
motor responses by visual objects in an object affordance task.
Here, participants made speeded squeeze responses with either their
left or right hand according to whether the object presented on each trial
belonged in a kitchen or a toolbox (see A for task details). The objects could
also afford a grasping action with either the left or right hand. Although
object affordance was irrelevant to the task, it still modulated responses
so that they were faster when the object afforded a congruent response
than an incongruent one (B). Furthermore, partial squeeze responses
(see C(ii) and C(iii) for examples of the responses recorded on
individual trials) were made significantly more often on incongruent
than on congruent trials—indicating that the afforded response had
been activated and at least partially executed on incongruent trials. These
figures are adapted with permission from Taylor and Francis and were
originally published in McBride et al. (2012), Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 65, 13–24,
www.tandfonline.com.
In a recent functional imaging study, Schaefer et al. (2010)
examined the neural correlates of unwanted movements in a
patient with alien limb syndrome with CBD. They reported
that voluntary and alien movements activated similar brain
regions, including motor and parietal cortices. However, the
right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), which has been associated
with inhibitory control of motor responses (e.g., Swann et al.,
2009, 2012; Hampshire et al., 2010; Verbruggen et al., 2010; see
also Aron, 2007), was activated only during alien movements.
Such activation may reflect unsuccessful attempts to inhibit alien
movements. Taken together, these studies highlight the impact
of automatically afforded actions, and suggest that alien limb
patients might find them particularly difficult to inhibit.
EVIDENCE FOR AUTOMATIC MOTOR ACTIVATION FROM
“PARTIAL” ERRORS
Another line of evidence that potentially reveals the automatic
effects of visual stimuli on actions comes from investigation
of erroneous responses. Typically, most evidence for automatic
motor priming by visual objects has been gleaned indirectly
by measuring the eventual outcome of this process on reaction
times, usually for manual button presses. Such responses are an
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all-or-nothing, binary measure: either the response made is of
sufficient magnitude to trigger a button press, or it isn’t. However,
it is possible that small amounts of force applied (erroneously) to
a button might be insufficient to trigger a measurable response
and thereby escape detection.
With this in mind, there has recently been revived interest in
employing continuous and sensitive measures of motor response
to more directly investigate processes of automatic motor activa-
tion on a trial-by-trial basis. McBride et al. (2012) employed such
a measure to investigate object affordances. They asked partici-
pants to classify object stimuli by squeezing one of two devices
placed in their left and right hands (see Figure 1A) while mea-
suring the force applied by either hand. Consistent with object
affordance effects, responses were faster on trials where the object
afforded an action with the same hand that was required to
make the response (congruent trials), compared to the opposite
hand (incongruent trials). But continuous, simultaneous force
recordings also revealed that participants made small erroneous
responses when there was conflict between the response afforded
by the object and the response required by the task, i.e., when the
stimulus afforded a response that was incongruent to the response
required by the task. Such errors were later corrected (Figure 1C).
These partial erroneous responses provide compelling evidence
that viewing an object activates motor plans appropriate for inter-
acting with that object, sometimes going far enough to produce a
partial response.
Electromyography (EMG) has also been used to demonstrate
“sub-threshold” erroneous responses on incompatible compared
to compatible trials in a variety of paradigms including Eriksen
flanker (e.g., Coles et al., 1985; Eriksen et al., 1985), and Simon
(e.g., Burle et al., 2002) tasks. For example, continuous mea-
surement of EMG from both arms of participants performing a
flanker task has demonstrated that correct button-press responses
on incompatible trials are frequently accompanied by some mus-
cle activity in the opposite hand, i.e., for the response associated
with the irrelevant flanker stimuli (Eriksen et al., 1985). Thus,
response-related muscle activity measured by EMG could be
measured in the absence of a “full” button-press response.
Such increased erroneous response activity on incongruent
trials provides strong evidence that an irrelevant stimulus—or
part of a stimulus—can automatically activate responses associ-
ated with it. These responses are not merely partially activated
somewhere in the brain; the response can be measured in the
muscles or in small hand movements with force transducers.
These “partial” responses are not captured by current the models
of decision-making, which instead assume that actions are either
executed wholly once the threshold for accumulated evidence is
reached, or not executed at all (see Smith and Ratcliff, 2004 for
a review of commonly used models and their characteristics).
These models assume that evidence in favor of particular action
possibilities is accumulated until a certain threshold of evidence
is reached. Models differ in how evidence accumulates. Some
(e.g., random-walk) assume that evidence is accumulated as a sin-
gle total so that evidence in favor of one response is necessarily
evidence counter to alternative responses (e.g., Link and Heath,
1975), whereas others (e.g. accumulator models e.g., Usher and
McClelland, 2001) assume that evidence in favor of competing
responses is accumulated separately, often with mutual inhibition
between the separate accumulators.
Importantly, all these decision models share the assumption
that once the accumulated evidence reaches a “threshold,” the
response is executed. This all-or-nothing property of decision
models does not allow any gradation of the response. Either the
evidence accumulating for a particular response reaches the deci-
sion threshold and the response is made, or it does not reach
threshold and no response is made. We anticipate that investiga-
tions of partial responses evoked by automatic activation ofmotor
responses will provide interesting constraints for future work in
decision-making.
INVISIBLE INFLUENCES
Thus far, in the evidence we have reviewed, the automatic nature
of motor priming has been inferred from interference effects:
if the participant or patient is engaged in a particular task and
stimuli interfere with that task, we infer that responses to the
task-irrelevant stimulus (or part of a stimulus) were not voli-
tional. Another way to study automatic influences is to investigate
the effects that invisible stimuli have on motor behavior. If an
observer is unaware of a stimulus, then traditionally it is con-
cluded that any response made to it cannot have been evoked
voluntarily and must, therefore, have been made automatically.
One way to present a stimulus subliminally is to use the back-
wards masking technique (e.g., Ögmen and Breitmeyer, 2006).
Using this technique, participants are usually required to make
a manual button press as quickly as possible to a target stimulus
(often a left or right pointing arrow). This target is preceded by a
“prime” stimulus for a very short duration (say, 20ms) which is
followed by an overlapping (or surrounding in the case of meta-
contrast masking) stimulus—or “mask.” This technique renders
the prime stimulus imperceptible to the observer. Even when the
participants cannot discriminate the identity of the prime under
forced choice, responses are generally faster and more accurate
when the prime stimulus was associated with the same response
as the target stimulus (compatible trial) compared to when the
prime was associated with the opposite response (incompatible
trial; e.g., Leuthold and Kopp, 1998). Thus, manual responses can
be partially activated automatically by visual stimuli even when
they cannot be consciously discriminated.
Subliminal stimuli can also prime a shift of attention (e.g.,
McCormick, 1997; Ivanoff and Klein, 2003; for a review see
Mulckhuyse and Theeuwes, 2010) so that observers respondmore
quickly and accurately to stimuli presented at the cued location
relative to an un-cued location. For instance, McCormick (1997)
manipulated the luminance of cues so that some were visible and
others were not. The cues were mostly invalid so the target was
most likely to appear at the opposite location to the cue. When
participants perceived the cue they were faster to respond to a tar-
get presented at the location opposite the cue, suggesting that they
had volitionally moved their attention to the most appropriate
(i.e., statistically predicted) location. However, when participants
were not aware of the cue they were faster to respond to targets
at the cued, relative to un-cued, location. This provides evidence
that the invisible cue produced an automatic and involuntary shift
of attention to the cued location.
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Cues do not have to be based on low-level differences in visual
salience in order to produce reliable effects. Socially relevant eye-
gaze can also direct attention exogenously. Responses are faster
to target stimuli that have been preceded by a non-predictive
face (or schematic drawing of a face) with the eyes gazing in the
direction of the target (e.g., Friesen and Kingstone, 1998, 2003;
Driver et al., 1999; but see Tipples, 2002). These so-called “gaze
cueing effects” have been shown following cues that have been
backwards-masked to render them invisible to the participant
(Sato et al., 2007). In summary, shifts of attention and motor
responses can be automatically and unconsciously triggered by
visual stimuli. Effects of non-perceived stimuli such as these have
provided key evidence that visual stimuli can automatically prime
the observer to act.
INHIBITION OF PRIMED ACTIONS
In the above section, we have reviewed evidence from parallel
domains that visual stimuli can automatically generate actions.
These automatically generated actions can interfere with the
intended or task-relevant response, and can be triggered by stim-
uli that are not consciously perceived, potentially facilitating
responses to them. But an important question that arises is how
such automatically primed responses might be controlled to allow
flexible, goal-directed, behavior. For it would not be useful to
respond to every object that we see. Thus, it is necessary to con-
sider how brain systems inhibit or override responses that have
been triggered automatically by the environment and are not
relevant to our current goals.
“Cognitive control” over simultaneously activated competing
motor plans has been extensively studied using “conflict” tasks
such as such as the Eriksen flanker task described above (see
Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), the Stroop color-word naming task
(e.g., Stroop, 1935) and the Simon task (for a review see Lu and
Proctor, 1995). In these tasks, multiple responses can be simulta-
neously activated and in conflict: one response according to the
task instruction and one evoked automatically by the irrelevant
stimulus (or irrelevant property of the target stimulus). Typical
theoretical frameworks for the congruency effects shown in con-
flict tasks suggest that stimuli are simultaneously processed by two
routes which converge at the level of response programming (e.g.,
dual route model by Kornblum et al., 1990; activation suppression
model by Ridderinkhof, 2002; see Figure 2A).
Processing by the fast, direct processing route is automatic, and
occurs irrespective of task instructions. For example, the spatial
location of a target stimulus in a Simon task would be processed
quickly and automatically via the direct processing route. At the
same time, processing of the task-relevant target attribute (e.g.,
target color in a Simon task) proceeds via a slower indirect pro-
cessing route. On congruent trials, the same response is activated
by both the direct and the indirect processing routes, producing
fast, correct responses. On incongruent trials, however, the direct
processing route and the indirect processing route activate differ-
ent responses which results in increased error rates, and slower
response times as the conflict between competing responses is
resolved.
Importantly, models of information processing in conflict
tasks often include an active inhibition mechanism which acts
to selectively suppress inappropriate response activation result-
ing from the direct processing route. Evidence for such control
over automatically activated responses can be gleaned by study-
ing the temporal dynamics of interference effects—for exam-
ple, by plotting the accuracy of responses as a function of
response speed as a Conditional Accuracy Function (CAF, see
van den Wildenberg et al., 2010 for a review; see Figure 2B).
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Information processing during a Simon task as modelled by
the Activation-Suppression model [e.g., Ridderinkhof (2002)]. The relevant
stimulus dimension (color in the Simon task) is processed via the slow,
indirect, processing route. Simultaneously, irrelevant stimulus location is
processed via the fast, direct, processing route. Activation of the
location-based response activation is inhibited by selective suppression
(shown here in red), which facilitates execution of the correct, color-based,
action. The selective suppression takes time to develop, which results in a
relatively high proportion of fast erroneous (location-based) responses on
incongruent trials, with near-perfect response accuracy when responses are
slower as the inappropriate responses have been suppressed. These effects
seen by plotting response accuracy as a function of response time in a
Conditional Accuracy Function (CAF) as shown in (B). Furthermore, the
interference on incongruent trials would be expected to reduce as
unwanted responses are suppressed as RTs increase. This effect can be
seen in the negative slope of a delta plot, as shown in (C). Delta
plots can reveal individual and group differences in motor activation and
suppression that cannot be seen in average measures of RT.
Panels (B) and (C) were originally published in van den Wildenberg et al.
(2010). Front. Hum. Neurosci. 4:222. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2010.00222.
Panel (B) was modified after Wylie et al. (2009), with permission from
Elsevier. Panel (C) was modified after Wylie et al. (2010).
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In conflict tasks, accuracy for compatible trials is near-perfect,
while fast responses on incompatible trials are often near (e.g.,
Wylie et al., 2009) or below (e.g., Stins et al., 2007) chance level.
This pattern of erroneous responses is unlikely to be purely a
result of fast-guessing, which would be expected to result in sim-
ilar accuracy levels for both incompatible and compatible trials.
Instead, these findings are consistent with the suggestion that
erroneous responses are activated quickly via the direct processing
route, before being selectively suppressed by an inhibitory control
mechanism.
How response activation and suppression change as a function
of response speed can also be seen in a delta plot (e.g., Burle et al.,
2002; Ridderinkhof, 2002; Ridderinkhof et al., 2005; Wylie et al.,
2010). This shows the size of the compatibility effect (RT on com-
patible trials subtracted from the RT on incompatible trials) as a
function of RT (see Figure 2C). The plots make use of the whole
RT distribution, rather than relying on a single measure of the
central tendency, and therefore, they can reveal differences in the
dynamics of response activation and suppression across individu-
als or groups even whenmean RTs are not reliably different. Delta
plots in traditional conflict tasks typically show initial positive
effects that level off, or even become negative, as response times
increase (e.g., de Jong et al., 1994; see also van den Wildenberg
et al., 2010 for a review). This leveling-off is consistent with sup-
pression of the unwanted stimulus-triggered response activation.
As this suppression takes time to develop, a pattern of facilitation
followed by inhibition is shown in the RT delta plot. Note how-
ever, that it is not necessary to postulate the existence of an active
inhibitory mechanism which acts to selectively suppress inappro-
priately activated responses to explain the temporal dynamics of
interference effects: the patterns shown in CAFs and delta plots
may instead be produced by early activation of the inappropri-
ate response which spontaneously decays over time (but see Burle
et al., 2002 for evidence against this suggestion).
PRE-STIMULUS VS. POST-STIMULUS COGNITIVE CONTROL
Control mechanisms that can override inappropriate response
plans which have been automatically evoked by the environ-
ment not only act to inhibit responses after they have been
evoked by the stimulus. Pre-stimulus control mechanisms also
seem to play a role. Thus, task set and previous experience can
modulate conflicting response tendencies in a preparatory man-
ner. Indeed, there is good evidence that pre-stimulus inhibitory
mechanisms play a role in controlling responses in many con-
texts, including stop-signal (e.g., Verbruggen and Logan, 2009b),
the anti-saccade (e.g., Everling and Munoz, 2000; Munoz and
Everling, 2004), and reaction time tasks incorporating warning
signals (e.g., Boulinguez et al., 2008).
The effects of pre-stimulus control have also been reported
in traditional “conflict” tasks. Thus, the size of the congruency
effect on the current trial in a conflict task can be modulated by
(1) a pre-cue indicating whether the upcoming trial will be con-
gruent or incongruent (e.g., Logan and Zbrodoff, 1982); (2) the
ratio of congruent and incongruent trials in a block or exper-
iment (e.g., Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979); and (3) whether the
immediately preceding trial was congruent or incongruent (the
so-called “Gratton effect” e.g., Gratton et al., 1988, 1992).
The Gratton effect has in particular been subject to much
investigation. While some have suggested that it arises from
repetition priming of exactly the same stimulus-response links
from previous trials (e.g., Mayr et al., 2003), others have reported
that it can occur without exact stimulus-response repetitions
(e.g., Kerns et al., 2004; Akçay and Hazeltine, 2007). An influ-
ential conflict monitoring hypothesis proposed that following the
response conflict experienced on an incongruent trial, cognitive
control mechanisms which resolve this conflict are boosted for the
next trial, in turn leading to reduced interference if the subsequent
trial is also incongruent (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001). This sugges-
tions is supported by several observations that performance on
incongruent trials is improved if they are preceded by another
incongruent trial relative to a congruent trial (e.g., by Gratton
et al., 1992 using Eriksen flankers; McBride et al., 2012 using
object affordance; and by Stürmer et al., 2002 using the Simon
task). However, this pattern has not consistently been reported
and several researchers have documented selective benefits for
compatible trials when the previous trial was also compatible
(e.g., Kunde and Wühr, 2006; Akçay and Hazeltine, 2007; van
Gaal et al., 2010a; Schlaghecken and Martini, 2011).
Schlaghecken and Martini (2011) recently accounted for these
discrepant findings by suggesting that the effects of trial history
on cognitive control were driven by a mechanism which responds
to the previous experience of both the presence and the absence of
conflict, arguing that the mechanism is one of context adaptation,
rather than conflict adaptation. Whatever the mechanisms are
that produce pre-stimulus control effects, it is clear that task set,
instruction, and previous experience canmodulate the apparently
automatic priming of motor responses by visual objects.
UNCONSCIOUS CONTROL OVER UNWANTED RESPONSES
Traditionally, cognitive control mechanisms resulting in response
inhibition have been considered as tightly coupled to conscious-
ness (e.g., Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin and Schneider,
1977, 1984), just as for voluntary control over actions. The logic
behind this view is that observers need to be aware of the interfer-
ing, control-evoking, stimulus in order for control mechanisms
to be implemented and for unwanted motor responses to be
suppressed. Such a suggestion is supported by evidence from
studies showing that inhibition of primed responses only operates
when stimuli are presented above—and not below—the threshold
required for conscious awareness (e.g., Merikle et al., 1995 using
the Stroop task).
However, there is now increasing evidence that some forms of
cognitive control can be executed entirely automatically, without
conscious awareness—or volition. Some of the most compelling
evidence for the automatic inhibition of unconsciously triggered
motor priming comes from several experiments by Eimer and
Schlaghecken (for reviews, see Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2003;
Sumner, 2007). In their paradigm, participants typically made
a speeded button-press response according to the direction of
a target arrow, which was preceded by a masked (subliminal)
prime. When the interval between mask and target was short
(e.g., 20–40ms), participants showed the expected speeding
of responses when prime and target were compatible relative
to when they were incompatible (positive compatibility effect,
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PCE). However, when the interval between prime and mask
was extended beyond around 100–150ms, incompatible trials
produced faster responses than compatible trials. In other words,
the usual priming effect had reversed.
This negative compatibility effect (NCE) has now been widely
reported with button-press responses, foot responses, and eye
movements (e.g., Eimer and Schlaghecken, 1998, 2002, 2003;
Schlaghecken and Eimer, 2000, 2002; Eimer et al., 2002; Aron
et al., 2003; Schlaghecken et al., 2003; Seiss and Praamstra, 2004;
Sumner et al., 2007; Boy et al., 2008; Hermens et al., 2010),
as well as in electroencephalogram recordings (e.g., Eimer and
Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003; Praamstra and Seiss, 2005). They can
also bias free-choice responses (e.g., Klapp and Hinkley, 2002;
Schlaghecken and Eimer, 2004; Klapp and Haas, 2005), and have
been shown both with familiar stimulus response mappings—
such as arrows—and also when stimuli have been arbitrarily
mapped to responses (e.g., Boy et al., 2008; Sumner, 2008).
Many researchers have suggested that this reversed priming
results from an inhibitory mechanism in the motor system which
acts to suppress sub-threshold motor activation evoked by the
prime (e.g., Eimer and Schlaghecken, 1998; Klapp and Hinkley,
2002; Schlaghecken and Eimer, 2002; Schlaghecken et al., 2006).
The most recent evidence suggests that such inhibition is trig-
gered by the arrival of new stimuli—that the appearance of
a second stimulus after the prime (normally the mask) auto-
matically elicits an “emergency brake” that cancels any motor
activation initiated by the prime (Jas´kowski and Przekoracka-
Krawczyk, 2005; Lleras and Enns, 2006; Jas´kowski, 2007, 2008;
Boy et al., 2008).
However, there has been considerable debate over whether
the NCE genuinely reflects an inhibitory mechanism rather than
arising from a purely perceptual process, or alternatively, from
positive priming (PCE) of a motor response associated with ele-
ments of the mask stimulus. Perceptual accounts suggest that the
NCE occurs because perceptual processing of the target stimulus
is slower following a compatible prime, due to habituation-like
processes such as “repetition blindness” or an attentional refrac-
tory period (Bavelier et al., 2000; Huber, 2008; Sohrabi and West,
2008; see also van Leeuwen and Lachmann, 2004, also discussed
in Lleras and Enns, 2005 alongside the object updating the-
ory; Hochhaus and Johnston, 1996; Huber et al., 2001, 2002;
Johnston et al., 2002; Sohrabi and West, 2009). Such perceptual
processes may play a role in producing some reversed priming
effects, but they cannot account for more recent findings. For
example, Boy and Sumner (2010) found that when participants
learned novel sensorimotor associations in a masked priming
task, and those response mappings were suddenly switched, both
positive and negative priming effects temporarily reversed (see
Figure 3)—indicating that the old response mappings continue
to be primed until the participants learn the new mappings
sufficiently well. Perceptual accounts of inverse priming cannot
explain this finding.
Alternatively, perceptual interactions between the prime and
the mask could end up causing motor priming in the opposite
direction to that expected from the prime. This idea has been
variously termed “object-updating,” “active mask,” or “mask-
induced priming” (Lleras and Enns, 2004; Verleger et al., 2004;
see Sumner, 2007 for review). Many early experiments usedmasks
that were constructed by superimposing features in the alternative
primes. In this case the most visually salient features of the mask
could be those that were new onsets in the stimulus sequence—
i.e., those that were not in the prime. Thus, the prime-mask
sequence could actually prime the response opposite the one asso-
ciated with the prime. Object updating may play a strong role in
producing the NCE when masks are constructed from prime fea-
tures, but they cannot account for the NCE in other cases where
masks do not contain elements of possible primes (e.g., Sumner,
2008).
Overall, therefore, reversed priming effects can be caused in
several ways. For the purposes of this review, the most interest-
ing one is a form of automatic motor inhibition, which can be
revealed with appropriate stimuli. Finding the NCE with sublim-
inally presented primes provides evidence that the mechanisms
at its origin are deployed automatically. If the observer is not
aware of the prime, then presumably they cannot volitionally
suppress any motor response associated with it. However, note
that the prime does not necessarily need to be subliminal for the
NCE to occur (e.g., Klapp and Hinkley, 2002; Klapp, 2005; Lleras
and Enns, 2005; Mattler, 2005; Sumner et al., 2006; Schlaghecken
et al., 2008).
AUTOMATIC INHIBITION IN THE AFFORDANCE PARADIGM
If the NCE shown in masked priming genuinely reflects an auto-
matic control mechanism to suppress sub-threshold activation of
an unwanted motor response (see above), one might expect to
see evidence of an NCE in other paradigms where visual stim-
uli automatically evoke motor responses. Vainio and colleagues
have recently reported that the positive stimulus-response com-
patibility effects usually shown in object affordance tasks can
become negative if the object stimulus is presented briefly and
then removed (e.g., Vainio, 2009; Vainio et al., 2011; see also
Vainio and Mustonen, 2011).
ThisNCE-likeeffectwasreportedevenwhentheprimestimulus
(e.g., a cup) was not relevant to the on-going task (respond to
direction of a subsequently presented target arrow), quite unlike
themaskedprimeparadigmwhereprimes typicallyneedtocontain
elements relevant to the task for NCEs to be observed (e.g., Eimer
and Schlaghecken, 1998). To account for this discrepancy, Vainio
and colleagues suggested that even though the cup primes in their
experimentswere irrelevant to theparticipants’ task, a small degree
of motor activation occurred due to the relatively long stimulus
duration (compared to the primes in previous NCE studies),
and the fact that the response association is highly over-learnt
(compared to the semi-arbitrary correspondence between simple
arrows or lines and a response). However, the associated motor
activation was still sub-threshold, and thus able to be reversed
by inhibition when perceptual support for that response was
interrupted (producing the observed NCE). Overall, these studies
suggest that actions which have been automatically primed by
object affordances may also be subject to automatic control.
AUTOMATIC TRIGGERING OF “ENDOGENOUS” CONTROL
In the masked prime paradigm, the participants are not actually
instructed to employ response inhibition—it just appears to occur
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Effects following the sudden reversal of the response mapping in
the paradigm used by Boy and Sumner (2010, Experiment 4).
Participants were trained to respond to targets in a masked prime
paradigm alternating short and long mask-target intervals by blocks
of five trials. Figure adapted with permission from Boy and Sumner (2010).
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 36, 892–905, originally published by
the American Psychological Association.
automatically following the prime and mask. In other paradigms,
participants are specifically asked to endogenously inhibit their
planned motor responses when cued to do so, for example in the
go/no-go task and stop signal task (e.g., Logan, 1994). In both
tasks, participants are instructed to respond as quickly as possible
to go-signals, but to withhold their response when other (“stop”)
stimuli occur.
Traditionally, such endogenous response inhibition has been
thought to depend on the conscious detection of stop signals
(e.g., Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2003). However, recent work
suggests that endogenous suppression of pre-potent responses
can also be primed or evoked unconsciously and automatically
(e.g., Verbruggen and Logan, 2009a; van Gaal et al., 2008, 2009,
2010a,b). For example, van Gaal et al. (2009, 2010b) examined
whether inhibition of a response could be triggered unconsciously
by amasked stop-signal. They reported that although participants
did not completely withhold their responses on unconscious
(strongly masked) stop trials, they were significantly slowed rel-
ative to go trials, indicating there was some (incomplete) sup-
pression of responses triggered by the imperceptible stop signal.
Thus, the control processes involved in suppressing responses can
be—at least partially—evoked by signals that are not consciously
perceived.
AUTOMATIC PRE-STIMULUS CONTROL
In the case of both the NCE and the “endogenous inhibition”
paradigms discussed above, inhibitory control processes appear
to be evoked to deal with motor activation after it has been
elicited. Is it also possible that pre-stimulus preparatory types
of control can be elicited automatically? Many researchers have
suggested that observers must consciously experience conflict in
order for the pre-stimulus control mechanisms to be deployed
(e.g., Kunde, 2003; Mayr, 2004; Ansorge et al., 2011). However,
recent evidence from van Gaal et al. (2010a) suggests that
some pre-stimulus control can be evoked automatically, without
conscious awareness (see Figure 4). They used a meta-contrast
masking paradigm to manipulate awareness of conflict-inducing
stimuli. Conflict between co-activated responses was either con-
scious (weakly masked primes) or unconscious (strongly masked
primes). The largest conflict adaptation effects occurred when
both the current and the previous trial were weakly masked (vis-
ible). Importantly, a small but statistically significant conflict
adaptation effect was evident when primes on trial n and trial n–1
were both presented below the threshold required for conscious
awareness (strongly masked condition). This is consistent with
the suggestion that unconsciously presented stimuli can automat-
ically evoke these pre-stimulus conflict adaptation mechanisms,
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FIGURE 4 | Automatic (unconscious) conflict adaptation effects as
shown in van Gaal et al. (2010a). Observers responded to the direction of a
target arrow stimulus that had been preceded by a backwards (meta-contrast)
masked prime that either corresponded with the response required to the
target (as shown in A), or was non-corresponding. The prime stimulus was
either conscious (presented for 129ms) or unconscious (presented for
14ms). Correspondence effects (non-corresponding—corresponding) on trial
n were modulated by whether trial n–1 was corresponding or not. These
effects were largest when both trial n and trial n–1 had visible primes (B), but
were still significant when both trial n and trial n–1 contained invisible primes.
These figures were originally published in van Gaal et al. (2010a). PLoS One
5:e11508. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0011508.
and can modulate the effects of subsequent conflicting stimuli.
However, this result should be interpreted cautiously because
responses are typically faster following fast responses (congruent
trials), and slower following slow responses (incongruent trials;
see e.g., Laming, 1979). If this effect were more apparent on
fast (congruent) trials than on slow (incongruent) trials then it
might entirely account for the small Gratton effect observed with
non-conscious stimuli.
OVERLAP BETWEEN BRAIN AREAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
AUTOMATIC AND VOLUNTARY CONTROL
The traditional distinction drawn between automatic and volun-
tary cognitive control is not only being challenged by behavioral
studies. Lesion and imaging studies have also revealed substan-
tial overlap between brain regions traditionally associated with
“voluntary” control and those active during automatic control.
Brain areas in medial frontal cortex such as the SMA and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) have traditionally been considered to be
important for voluntary control (for a review, see Nachev et al.,
2008). However, they also seem to be involved in mediating auto-
maticmotor activation and suppression of unwanted action plans
(e.g., D’Ostilio and Garraux, 2011, 2012). For example, Sumner
et al. (2007) used a masked prime paradigm to reveal that two
extremely rare patients with microlesions of the SMA and/or the
adjacent supplementary eye field (SEF) showed normal PCEs but
failed to show NCEs, unlike healthy matched controls. These data
are consistent with the view that the SMA and SEF may play
causal roles in producing the automaticmotor inhibition indexed
behaviorally by the NCE. Thus, areas involved in the voluntary
control of action might play a crucial role in automatic inhibi-
tion of unwanted actions (in this case, evoked by the subliminal
prime).
There is also evidence from healthy observers that the SMA
and nearby pre-SMA are involved in producing the uncon-
scious NCE in healthy observers. Recent research from van Gaal
et al. (2011b), found that individual differences in pre-SMA
gray matter density were correlated with participants’ ability to
correctly respond to a target that had been preceded by a strongly
masked (invisible) incompatible prime. Furthermore, Boy et al.
(2010a) found that the fMRI signal was modulated by (invis-
ible) prime compatibility in the SMA. Moreover, by studying
normal participants’ in vivo neurochemistry through magnetic
resonance spectroscopy (MRS), Boy et al. (2010a) found that
for a region including the SMA, the measured concentration of
gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA)—the main neurotransmit-
ter responsible for neuronal inhibition—was correlated with the
magnitude of the NCE.
There is also overlap between “voluntary” and “automatic”
neural mechanisms involved in more conventional inhibition
tasks such as go/no-go, and stop signal paradigms. van Gaal et al.
(2010b) found that the amplitude of a fronto-central N2 event-
related potential (ERP) component was reliably correlated with
successful stopping on weakly masked (conscious) stop trials, and
with the amount of slowing on strongly masked (unconscious)
stop trials (as measured by the stop signal reaction time; SSRT).
Thus, the size of this N2 component correlated with behav-
ioral measures of both conscious and unconscious suppression of
response. In addition, functional imaging has shown that strongly
masked no-go signals activate much of the same brain areas that
are activated by weakly masked no-go signals, particularly the
pre-SMA and inferior frontal cortex (van Gaal et al., 2010b).
The strength of activation in these areas was positively correlated
with the amount of slow-down on strongly masked no-go trials—
which supports the suggestion that this activity may be functional
and have a direct effect on stopping behavior.
Taken together, these findings challenge the traditional
assumption that voluntary control and involuntary mechanisms
occur through distinct pathways in the brain. Rather, there is
considerable overlap between the brain regions which are active
during consciously and unconsciously triggered action control.
DISSOCIATIONS IN AUTOMATIC AND VOLUNTARY CONTROL
Recent work from Boy et al. (2010b) suggests that the important
distinction is not between control that is automatic compared
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a PCE in response times is found (green arrows in B). If the SOA is longer
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4-B. Results: for positive priming (PCE), the priming effect was additive with
the effect of flanker interference. For the NCE, which measures subliminal
inhibition, there was an interaction with flanker interference. This interaction
did not occur for pre-stimulus control [data not shown here, see Boy et al.
(2010b)].
to control that is voluntary, but rather between pre- and post-
stimulus control (see discussion above on pre- vs. post-stimulus
control). These investigators used a hybrid task which inte-
grated masked priming into an Eriksen flanker paradigm (see
Figure 5A). They showed an interaction between the post-
stimulus inhibitory influences caused by prime-mask sequence
(the NCE) and the post-stimulus control of flanker interfer-
ence. Thus, these processes presumably share some common
mechanisms (see Figure 5B). However, when examining the
influence of the previous trials’ flankers on performance in the
current trial (the Gratton effect, see section on pre-stimulus
control), no such interaction was found with the NCE. This
suggests that pre-stimulus control mechanisms did not share pro-
cesses with the NCE, and thus are distinct from post-stimulus
mechanisms.
FLEXIBLE AUTOMATICTY
Automatic and unconscious processes are traditionally regarded
as inflexible (e.g., Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin and
Schneider, 1977, 1984), quite distinct in quality from the flex-
ible nature of “voluntary” processes. However, there is increas-
ing evidence that automatic and subliminal processes can in
fact be modulated by “top-down” processes of attention, inten-
tion (“task set” or current goals) and expectation. For example,
Kentridge and colleagues (e.g., Kentridge et al., 1999, 2004, 2008)
have reported a series of studies in which attention modulates
apparently subconscious processing, both in a “blindsight”
patient, GY, and in normal participants. Focussing attention in
time (e.g., Naccache et al., 2002) and in space (Lachter et al., 2004;
Sumner et al., 2006; Marzouki et al., 2007) can also modulate
the effects of masked primes on motor responses. For example,
positive and negative compatibility effects in a masked prime
task can be enhanced by exogenously pre-cueing prime location
(Sumner et al., 2006), and in such a way that was not simply
explained by an attentional boost to the perceptual strength of
the prime. This suggests that attention does not only enhance
perceptual processing, but can also modulate sensori-motor
linkages.
Task set-up and instruction can also modulate many of the
effects of visual stimuli on motor responses and control. As
noted above, prime stimuli in masked priming tasks generally
only affect responses when they share task-relevant elements with
the target stimuli (e.g., Eimer and Schlaghecken, 1998; see also
Huang et al., 2011). For example, Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998)
found no NCE when participants responded to letter targets that
had been preceded by masked arrow primes, even though arrow
primes reliably prime responses when targets are also arrows.
Moreover, recent evidence shows that object affordance effects are
also dependent on the goals of the observer. Bub and Masson
(2010) demonstrated that the handle of a mug only produced
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reliable affordance effects on reach and grasp responses, not when
the response was made via a speeded button press.
Unconscious “endogenous” control over responses also
depends on task instruction. Wokke et al. (2011) tested partic-
ipants with a go/no-go task in which a masked (unconscious)
prime stimulus preceded an unmasked (conscious) target. One of
two possible targets was presented on each trial, but unlike other
studies, stimuli were not consistently paired with either a “go” or
a “no-go” response across a testing session. Instead, which of the
possible targets required a “go” or a “no-go” response was cued
on a trial-by-trial basis. Response inhibition rates were improved
when a “no-go” target was preceded by an invisible “no-go” cue.
As the instruction cue manipulation eliminated any long-term
associations being built up between stimulus and response, it
seems that control processes evoked by unconsciously presented
stimuli can be triggered in a flexible manner according to task
instruction.
Finally, pre-stimulus, conflict adaptation effects such as the
Gratton effect can also be modulated, seemingly by reward (van
Steenbergen et al., 2009). For example, van Steenbergen and col-
leagues (2009) showed that the conflict adaptation effect in a
flanker task can be reduced by reward, even though rewards were
given arbitrarily and were unrelated to the task. In fact Botvinick
(2007) has recently suggested that conflict might be experienced
as a negatively reinforcing event. As such, it is possible for the
effects of conflict (a negative stimulus) to be counteracted by
a positive stimulus (reward)—an example of possible flexible
control over an automatic response.
Taken together, these findings indicate that seemingly “auto-
matic” response activation and control can be implemented
flexibly—quite unlike the traditionally inflexible view of auto-
matic processes.
CONCLUSION
The evidence described in this review demonstrates that stim-
uli can automatically prime specific, purposeful actions. Simple
stimuli can capture eye movements, produce activity in motor-
related brain areas, and can trigger the actions afforded by an
object. Because observers are constantly bombarded by a complex
set of visual stimulations, such automatic activation of potential
responses is likely to be important, either in facilitating responses
or requiring inhibition so other responses can be made. While
their effects might not be obvious in healthy adults, the effects of
such automatic activation of motor programs can be dramatically
revealed following brain damage (e.g., in alien limb syndrome or
utilization behavior).
A necessary pre-requisite for flexible, goal-directed action is
the ability to inhibit inappropriate, competing, responses even
when those competing responses have been activated automat-
ically. Cognitive control has traditionally been seen as tightly
coupled to awareness, it has been suggested that an observer must
be aware of a stimulus in order to inhibit motor activation evoked
by that stimulus. Many of the findings reviewed here challenge
this assumption and instead suggest there is substantial overlap
between the mechanisms supporting conscious and unconscious
control of responses. Thus, we suggest that while there may be dif-
ferences between automatic and voluntary control, they may not
be entirely distinct in the brain, that automatic processes may play
a role in all behavior, and that we must revise traditional views
that couple cognitive control to consciousness and automaticity
to inflexibility.
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